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[Sac. No. 7429. In Bank. Dec. 13, 1962.] 
Inre DONERAL PATTERSON, a Minor. DONERAIJ 
PATTERSON, Appellant, v. THE PEOPLE, Respond-
ent. 
[1] Delinquent Children-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings 
-Notice.~Notice by telephone satisfies the requirement of 
Welf. & Inst. Code, § 630, thnt notice of a detention hearing 
be given to a parent, since that code section expressly provides 
that such notice may be given orally. 
[2] Id.-Correction of Delinquency-Proeeedings-Right to Coun- . 
sel.-Where .the records before a superior court sitting as.n. 
juvenile court at the commencement of a hearing to determine 
. whether a minor should be declared a ward of the juvenile 
court and committed to the care and custody of the Youth 
Authority reflected that the minor had been advised at the 
detention hearing of his right to counsel and that his mother, 
. who was present at the hearing on the petition that the minor 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Delinquent, Dependent and Neglected Chil. 
dre~§U . 
MeR. Dig. References: [1] Delinquent Children, § 12(2); [2, 3] 
Delinquent Children, § 12(2.1): [4, 6,7] Delinquent Children, 
§ 12(5); [5] Criminal Law, § 564(6). 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
) 
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be declared a ward of the court, had been advised of the right 
to counsel in the notice of hcaring personally served on her, 
and where no request had Leen made by either the minor or 
his mother for the appoinhncnt of connsel, tl1l1 judge was justi-
fied in proceeding with the hearing without again advising the 
minor or his mother of the right to counsel. 
[8] ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Right to Coun-
sel.-The juvenile court had no obligation to appoint counsel 
for a minor charged with entering a dwelling with intent to 
commit theft in a. hearing to determine whether such minor 
should be declared a ward of the. court and committed to the 
care and custody of the Youth Authority, despite the require-
ment of Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700, that counsel be appointed 
for a minor in such a hearing in e.very case where the minor's 
parent or guardian is indigent if the minor is charged with 
misconduct that would constitute a felony if committed by an 
adult, since the statute also provides that such an appointment 
is mandatory only if the parent or guardian desires the ap-
pointment of counsel and the minor's parent had not indicated 
any desire for counsel. 
[4] ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Evidence.-A 
judgment declaring a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court 
and committing him to the care and custody of the Youth 
Authority was supported by the probation officer's report relat-
ing to the minor's activities and by the fact that when the 
minor appeared before the juvenile court, the charges against 
him were. read and he admitted their truth in open court. 
[5] Criminal Law-Evidence-Corpus Delicti.-Testimony of an 
accused at his trial admitting the truth of the charges again'3t 
him not only establishes the corpus delicti of the offense but 
also is sufficil'nt to justify a judgment. 
[6] Delinquent Children-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings 
-Evidence.-Admission by a minor of the charges against him 
in open court is the equivalent of a plea of guilty and there-
fore raises no issue of fact and precludes the necessity for the 
presentation of evidence in support of the allegations con-
tained in A petition seeking to have him declared a ward of 
the court. 
[7] ld.-Correction of Delinquency-Proceedings-Evidence-Prc-
sumptions.-The.presumption that the trial judge properly re-
viewed the probation officer's report and the other records 
before him at the time of a hearing to determine whether or 
not a minor should be declared a ward of the juvenile court antI 
committed to the care and custody of the Youth Authority was 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 489; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed 
§ 1234). 
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applicable in such hearing where there was no showing that 
the statutory requirements were not followed by the judge. 
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacra-
mento County sitting as a juvenile court declaring a 17 -year-
old boy to be a ward of the court and committing him to the 
care and custody of the Youth Authority. John Quincy Brown, 
Judge. Judgment affirmed. 
S. Carter McMorris for Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, aIld Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy Attor-
ney General, for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-Doneral Patterson, a minor aged 17, ap-
peals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento 
County sitting as a juvenile court, declaring him a ward 
thereof and committing him to the care and custody of the 
Youth Authority. 
Facts: The minor was charged with entering a residence 
"with the intent to commit the crime of theft, thereby violat-
ing Section 459 of the Penal Code of California." 
He was taken into custody on Kovember 30, 1961. His 
mother and only available parent, Opal Patterson, was given 
telephonic notice of the detention hearing before the juvenile 
court referee, set for December 1, 1961. 
Following the detention hearing, the court by order 
adopted the referee's recommendation that the minor be 
committed to the custody of the county probation officer, to 
be detained in the Juvenile Hall pending hearing of a petition 
that he be declared a ward of the court. 
Written notice of the hearing on the petition, set for De-
cember 18, 1961, was personally served on the minor's mother. 
After the hearing, the juvenile court declared the minor a 
ward of the court. 
These questions are presented for determination: 
[1] First. Was insufficient notice of the detention hearing 
given to the minor's mother, resulting in a lack of jurisdic-
tion in the juvenile court f 
No. Section 630 of the Welfare and Institutions Code ex-
pressly provides that notice of a detention hearing may be 
given to a parent orally. Notice by telephone satisfies this 
requirement and constitutes due process of law. (Drummey 
) 
) 
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v. State Board of Funeral Directors, 13 Ca1.2d 75, 80 [2] 
[87 P.2d 848] ; Litchfield v. County of :Marill, 130 CaLApp.2d 
806,813 [7] et seq. [280 P.2d 117].) 
It is conceded that notice of the detention hearing was 
personally served on the mother of the minor by telephone. 
Under the foregoing rules, this constituted sufficient notice. 
[2] Second. Were the minor and his parent adequately 
apprised of the right to counsel? 
Yes. Section 633 of the Welfare and Institutions Code re-
quires that when a minor appears at a detention hearing he, 
and his parent or guardian if present, be "informed of the 
reasons why the minor was taken into custody, the nature of 
the juvenile court proceedings, and the right of such minor 
aud his parent or guardian to be represented at every stage 
of the proceedings by counseL" 
An affidavit of 'Walter A. Schmidt, the referee of the 
juvenile court, established that the minor was advised at the 
detention hearing of the right to counsel. The minor's moth-
er did not attend that hearing. 
Section 658 of the Welfare and Institutions Code requires 
that notice of the hearing on a petition to declare a minor 
a ward of the court be served upon all the minor's parents 
and guardians whose residence addresses are known. Section 
659 requires that such notice contain a "statement that the 
minor, or his parent or guardian, is entitled to have his at-
torney present at the hearing on the petition, and that, if the 
parent or guardian is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, 
and the minor or his parent or guardian desires to be re-
presented by an attorney, such parent or guardian shall 
promptly notify the clerk of the juvenile court." 
The mother of the minor was personally served with notice 
of the hearing on the petition, which notice contained the 
statement required by section 659. 
Section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions Code provides, 
among other things, that at the beginning of the hearing on 
a petition to declare one a ward of the juvenile court the 
"judge shall alicertain whether the minor or his parent or 
guardian has been informed of the right of the minor to be 
represented by counsel, and if not, the judge shall advise the 
minor and the parent or guardian, if present, of the right to 
have counsel present. If the parent or guardian is indigent 
and desires to have the minor represented by counsel, the 
court may appoint counsel to represent the minor, and in 
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such case the court must appoint.counsel if the minor. is· 
charged with misconguct which would constitute a felony if 
committed by un adult." . . 
Accordingly, the judge is reqllired to ascertain at the be-
ginning of the hearing whether the parent or the minor has 
.• been informed of the right to .counsel and isthtmrequired to 
advise them of such right orily if hellas ascertained that they 
have not previously been informed thereof.· . 
The records· before the court at the commencement . of the 
hearing reflected that the tninorhadbeen advised at the 
detention hearing of the right to counsel and that his mother, 
who was present at the hearing on the petition, had been ad-
vised of the right to counsel in the notice of hearing per. 
sonally served upon her. . 
Once the judge had ascertaiiled· from the records then be-
fore him that the minor andhis.parent had been informed of 
the right to counsel and that no request had been . made for 
the appointment of counsel, he was justified in proceeding 
without again advising the minor or his parent of the right 
to counsel. That duty would have evolved upon him only if it 
had appeared that they had not previously been advised of 
such right. 
[3] The minor further contends that section 700 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code requires that counsel be ap. 
pointed in every ease where the parent or guardian is in. 
digent if the minor is charged with misconduct which would 
constitute a felony if committed by an adult. 
This contention overlooks the further requirement in the . 
section that such an appointment is mandatory ouly if the 
parent or guardian desires the appointment of counsel. The 
record is devoid of any evidence which would indicate such 
a desire on the part of the minor's parent. If, as here, the 
parent has not indicated any desire for counsel,the court has 
no obligation to appoint counsel, and its failure to do so did 
not vitiate the judgment entered. 
[ 4] Thtrd. Was the minor's admission of the. chargcs 
against kim the equivalent of a plea of guilty and, as such, 
SUfficient to support tke judO'rncnt' 
Yes. The minor argues that there was insufficient evidence 
to support the judgment and that the probation officer's re-
port was improperly admitted and considered by the court, 
Rillce the report contained conclusions and hearsay. This COIl-
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Cal.App.2d 662, 664 [2] [20 Ca1.Rptr. 313] ; In re Halamuda, 
85 Cal.App.2d 210,223 [192 P.2d 781].) 
In addition to the report that was received in evidence 
when the minor appeared before the court, the charges were 
read, and he admitted their truth in open court. [5] The 
testimony of an accused at his trial not only establishes the 
corpus delicti of the offense but is sufficient tojustifya judg-
ment. (People v. Hill, 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 155 [37 P.2d 849] 
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; People v. Hudson, 
139 Cal.App. 543, 544 [2] [34 P.2d 741].) 
[6] It is likewise settled that the admission by a minor 
of the charges against him ill open court is the equivalent of 
a plea of guilty and therefore raises no issue of fact and pre-
cludes the necessity for the presentation of evidence in sup-
port of the allegations contained in the petition. (In re 
Dargo, 81 Ca1.App.2d 205, 208 [4] et seq. [183 P.2d 282] 
[hearing denied by the Supreme Court] ; cf. People v. Johns, 
173 Ca1.App.2d 38, 42 [2,3] [343 P.2d 92].) 
[7] Fourth. D·id the trial judge properly review the 
report of the p1'obation officer and the other records before 
him at the time of the hearing' 
Yes. It must be presumed, in the absence of a showing to 
the contrary, that the statutory requirements were followed 
by the trial judge. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1963, subd. 15; People 
v. Downer, 57 Cal.2d 800, 817 [22 Cal.Rptr. 347, 372 P.2d 
107] ; People v. Cifrino, 46 Cal.2d 284,287 [2] [294 P.2d 32] ; 
In re Smith, 33 Cal.2d 797, 801 [2] [205 P.2d 662] ; 28 Cal. 
Jur.2d (1956) § 5, p. 618. No showiug to the contrary was 
made in the present case. Therefore, the presumption is 
here applicable. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J.,. concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-I dissent. In my opinion 
the decision herein renders superfluous and unenforceable the 
provisions ,of section 700 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code l relating to the right to counsel and thus frustrates the 
• Assigned by Chairman of .Judicial Council. 
1" At the beginning of the hearing on a pctition filed pursuant to 
Article 7 (commcncing with scction 6(0), the judge or clerk shall first 
read the petition to those present and upon request of the minor upon 
whose behalf the petition has ueen urought or upon the request of any 
parent, relative or guardian, the judge shall explain any term or allega. 
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purpose of the Legislature to safeguard that right in the 
juvenile court . 
.A. judge can now "ascertain" whether the minor and his 
parents have been informed of the minor's right to be rep-
resented by counsel simply by examining the records to 
note whether the notices required by sections 6332 and 6593 
were given. He nced not pJace anything on record to indi-
cate that he has even made that examination. He need not 
undertake any investigation to determine that the records 
before him are correct. He need not determine whether the 
absence of counsel at the hearing is the result of an intelligent 
and understanding waiver of the right to counsel. 
Section 700, so interpreted, becomes superfluous for no stat-
ute is necessary to impose a duty upon the juvenile court 
judge to determine whether the requirements of sections 633 
and 659 have been met. .A. judge necessarily has a duty in 
every case, particularly when a party is 110t represented b~: 
counsel (see In re Masching, 41 Ca1.2d 530, 534 [261 P.2d 
251] ), to determine that the proceedings in the case accord 
with statutory requirements. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.) 
Section 700, so interpreted, becomes unenforceable, for if 
the judge fails to examine the records to determine whether 
r,eetions 633 and 659 were complied with and remains silent 
as to such failure, the minor and his parents are without a 
remedy. It will be presumed that the examination was made, 
tion contained therein and Ule nature of the hcaring, its procedures, amI 
possible consequences. The judge shall ascertain whether the minor or 
his parent or guardian has been informed of the right of the minor to 1)e 
represented by counsel, and if not, the judge shall ad"ise the minor and 
the parent or guardian, if present, of the right to have counsel present. 
If the parent or guardian is indigent and desires to have the minor 
represented by counsel, the court may appoint counsel to represent the 
minor, and in such case the court must appoint counsel if the minor is 
charged with misconduct which would constitute a felony if committed 
by an adult. The court may rontinue the hearing for not to exceed sevcn 
days, as necessary to make an appointment of counsel, or to enahlc 
counsel to acquaint himself with the case, or to determine whether the 
parent or guardian is indigent and unable to afl'oru counsel at his own 
expense. " 
'Section 633 provides that upon his appearance nt the detention hc~rillg 
the minor and h.is parent or guardian, if present, "shall first be illforl1IC11 
of ••• the right of such minor and his parent or guardian to be repre· 
sented at every stage of the proceedings I,y c(lunsel." 
'Section 6;:;9 providcs that the notice to the parent or guardian of the 
court hearing to determine wardship must contain" a statement that the 
minor, or his parent or guardian, is entitled to ha\'c his attorney present 
at the hearing. • • ." 
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absent an affirmative showing to the contrary, which the minor 
and his parents will ordinarily bc unable to make:' 
. The California Juvenile Court Law of 1961 was the prod-
uct of years of extensive study and criticism of juveuilc court 
procedures. The charge that in their informal procedures 
juvenile courts were sacrificing fundamental procedural 
rights of the offender was a matter of national concern,fi Ex-
tensive studies of the California juvenile courts were ullder-
taken by a special commission appointed by the Governor, 
and a more limited study of wardship and the right tocoun-
sel by the California Law Revision Commission. These studies 
found that many judges believed that attorneys had no place 
in juvenile court proceedings6 and that a majority of judges 
did not inform the minor or his parents of their right to 
representation by counseJ.7 They concluded that legislation 
was nccessary to compel judges to inform the minor and his 
parents of this important right.s Many of the provisions en-
acted by the Legislature, including those before us in this 
case, were taken verbatim from the recommendations of the 
Governor's Commission. Section 700 is thus part of a com-
prehensive plan of remedial legislation, enacted after careful 
study and drafting. Under these circumstances, it is evident 
that it was the Legislature's purpose to make section 700 a 
"The Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile 
Justice (1960) part II, pages 12-14, and a Stanford Law Review study 
(see Note, The California Juvenile Court (1958) 10 Stan. L. Rev. 471, 
500-501) noted the extreme hostility of some judges to the participation 
of attorneys in juvenile court proceedings. The statute before us was 
enacted because of the undesirable results of that hostility. In the light 
of this background, it cannot be assumed that appellate court supervision 
will not be necessary to ensure that the purpose of section 700 is fully 
accomplished. Under today's decision, however, such supervision is 
impossible. 
·See e.g., Senate Com. on the Judiciary, Juvenile Delinquency, S. Rep. 
No. 430, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); United States Dept. of Health, 
Education & Welfare, Standards for Specialized Courts Dealing with 
Children (19.34); Ellrod & Melany, Juvenile Justice: Treatment Of' 
Travesty? (1950) 11 U.Pitt. L. Rev. 277; 0 'Neil, Criminal Law (1951) 
Mercer L. Rev. 46; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender (1957) 
41 Minn. L. Rev. 547; Note, Due Process in the Juvenile Courts (1952) 
2 Catholic U. L. Rev. 90. 
-Report of tte Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Jus. 
tice (1960) part I, p. 13; Note, The California Juvenile Court, supra, 
10 Stan. L. Rev. at p. 500. 
'Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Jus· 
tice (1960) part I, p. 26; ld. part II, p. 12. 
'Report of the Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Jus-
tice (1960) part I, p. 26, 72-73; 3 Calif. L. Revision Com'n Reports 
(1960),p. E6. 
) 
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~igllifit"ant onc alld that an illtHprl'tatioll that rcnders it UIl-
necessary and Ullcnforceahle frustrates that purpose. 
'rIte Governor's COlllmission, which drafted the exact wOl'd-
ing of section 700, stated that "in our opinion, all judges 
should be required to inform the miuornlld his pan'lIb of 
this right [to counsel] as a routine part of the juvenile eomt 
procedure." (Part I, p. 26; accord, 3 Calif.L. HeyisiOll 
Com. Report (1960), p. E6.) Although the minor ll1a~r be 
personally informed of the right to eoullsl'l at the detention 
hearing and a parent may be given written notice of the right, 
they are not informed of that right by the judge at the hear-
ing to determine wardship when the judge docs not utter a 
word about it. Indeed, n parent would not be informed of 
the right by any judge unless the parent had been present 
earlier at the detention hearing. 
In part II of its report (page 14), the Governor's Com-
mission quotes with approval from Shioutalwn v. District of 
Columbia (D.C.Cir. 1956.) 236F.2d666, 670: "{W] here 
that right [to counsel] exists, the court must be assured that 
any waiver of it is intelligent and competent." (Accord, 
People v. Chesser, 29 Ca1.2d 815 [178 P.2d 76, 170 A.L.R. 
246].) Obviously the court cannot be assured of that fact 
simply by noting that the form notice delivered to the parent 
contains a statement that the juvenile has a right to be re-
presented by counsel. There is no assurance that the notice 
was read, that the parent was able to read, or if he could 
read that he understood what representation by counsel 
meant. Even if the minor was personally informed at the 
detention hearing of his right to counsel, there is 110 assur-
ance that any waiver, whether express or inferred, as in this 
case, from his appearance at the hearing unaccompanied by 
counsel, was "intelligent and competent." The Governor '8 
Commission noted the irony of regarding minors as incompe-
tent in financial matters and yet assuming their competence 
to make important legal decisions "which may involve a 
drastic curtailment of the minor's freedom and liberty." 
(Part I, p. 27.) Only by carefully questioning the minor 
could a judge ascertain that the minor's waiver of counsel 
was intelligent and competent. {See Williams v. Illiff 
(D.C.Cir. 1944) 142 F.2d 91.) 
., Ascertain" means "to find out with certainty." (\Veb-
8ter's New World Dictionary of the American Language.) 
What can the judge find out with certainty if he need only 
examine the recitals in the records before him f Even if the 
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recitals in the records are correct, he can only discover that 
a written notice was given the parents and that a statement 
was made to the minor. There is no meaningful sense in 
which it can he said that someone is informed "of the right 
to representation hycounsel" unless he understands the 
meaning and significanceoL that right. To "ascertain" 
if he has been so "informed" the judge must "find out with 
certainty" whether he has ,an intelligent comprehension of 
the right. 
In my opinion. the purpose of the Legislature in enacting 
section 700 and the language it used to express that purpose 
require the judge at the outset of the hearing personally to· 
find out by examining the .minor and his parents or guardian, 
if present, whether they have been informed of the minor's 
right to representation by counsel and whether they wish 
the aid of counsel.. Iuperforming that duty the judge must 
also make certain that they understand the nature of the 
charge and its possible. consequences and that if they cannot 
afford to employ counsel, the court can appoint counsel, if 
the charge is or· felony proportions. 
The judge's duty to protect the rights and interests of the 
minor is particularly significant when a right as vitally im-
portant as the right to representation by counsel is at stake. 
That duty is not discharged when the judge does not even 
mention that right or show enough interest to question the 
juvenile or his parent or guardian to ascertain whether the 
. right to counsel is understood and has .not been waived 
through ignorance or misunderstanding. The burden such 
inquiries place on the judge is minimal when compared with 
the risk of misinformed waiver and the consequent loss to 
both the minor and the judge of the aid that counsel can give 
them in the discovery of the truth and if necessary the formu-
lation of plans of rehabilitation. 
Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 9, 
1963. White, ,J.,. participated in place of Peek, J., who 
deemed himself disqualified. Traynor, J., Peters, J., and 
. Tobriner, J., were of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. . 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
